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IN  DEFENSE  OF  EMPIRICISM  IN  FAMILY  LAW
Elizabeth S. Scott*
It is fitting to include an essay defending the application of empirical research to family law
and policy in a symposium honoring the scholarly career of Peg Brinig, who is probably the
leading empiricist working in family law.  While such a defense might seem unnecessary, given
the expanding role of behavioral, social, and biological research in shaping the regulation of
children and families, prominent scholars recently have raised concerns about the trend toward
reliance on empirical science in this field.  A part of the criticism is directed at the quality of the
science itself and at the lack of sophistication of legal actors, who may be unable to evaluate
research adequately or to understand the limits for particular legal purposes of even well-designed
and well-executed studies.  For example, decisionmakers increasingly use algorithms that critics
argue incorporate questionable factors.  Also, researchers themselves may have biases that shape
outcomes.  And one study, or a handful, is a thin reed on which to base any policy.  But skeptics
also challenge family law’s turn to empiricism on more fundamental grounds, arguing that
emphasis on empirical knowledge may obscure important value competitions in family law or
have undue influence on how different values are prioritized.  Ultimately, critics raise the concern
that the use of empirical knowledge can reinforce bias and harm marginalized families and
communities.
This Essay acknowledges these problems but suggests that most concerns can be alleviated by
more careful and sophisticated use of science.  The application of science to questions of family
and juvenile law is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Legal actors have already become skillful in
the use of this tool, and interdisciplinary teams of legal scholars and researchers have played a
key role in the design of research and translation of empirical knowledge to law.  This trend holds
extraordinary promise as a means to inform regulation in ways that enhance individual and
social welfare.  The Essay highlights issues on which the introduction of scientific knowledge has
resulted in beneficial reforms.  First, twenty-first century juvenile justice regulation increasingly
has been shaped by developmental science clarifying that teenage offenders differ in important
ways from adult counterparts.  Second, policies supporting family preservation and healthy child
development have gained support from a large body of research on child development as well as
programmatic studies.  These examples provide lessons for the use of research in this domain.
Finally, the Essay probes the foundational critique of empiricism in family law and argues
that the threat may be less severe than critics fear.  To be sure, values shape family law and
policy, and competing values often cannot be prioritized solely (or even largely) on the basis of
empirical knowledge.  But values often have empirical content, and accuracy in evaluating the
stakes of the value contests is important.  Moreover, the evidence does not support the concern
© 2020 Elizabeth S. Scott.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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that answers offered by empirical studies will be given undue weight in values competitions.  The
likely alternative—reliance on conventional wisdom and assumptions about the world—is usu-
ally inferior as a basis of policy and possibly more likely to result in biased calculations harmful
to marginalized families.
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INTRODUCTION
It seems very appropriate to reflect on the expanding role of empirical
research in family law and policy in a symposium honoring the scholarship
and career of Peg Brinig, who is probably the leading empiricist working in
this field.1  Empirical research has played an increasingly prominent role in
family law and affiliated fields such as youth crime regulation in recent years,
due to the work of Brinig and others.  Whereas in an earlier era, courts and
regulators relied on common sense and intuition about family life and child
development (“any parent knows”),2 increasingly lawmakers turn to scientific
studies to support assumptions about children’s needs, adolescent decision-
1 Brinig is a model interdisciplinary scholar.  She is trained as a lawyer and as an
economist, and she has also collaborated with a variety of scholars, including sociologists,
economists, and legal scholars. See Douglas W. Allen & Margaret Brinig, Child Support
Guidelines and Divorce Incentives, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (2012); Douglas W. Allen &
Margaret Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any Difference?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
304 (2011) [hereinafter Allen & Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws]; Margaret F. Brinig &
Marsha Garrison, Getting Blood from Stones: Results and Policy Implications of an Empirical Inves-
tigation of Child Support Practice in St. Joseph County, Indiana Paternity Actions, 56 FAM. CT. REV.
521 (2018); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Legal Status and Effects on Children, 5 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J.  548 (2008); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, The One-Size-Fits-All
Family, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 137 (2009).
2 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005)); see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979) (“[P]ages of human
experience . . . teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests.”); see also
Clare Huntington, Essay, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 237–38
(2018) (discussing the earlier era’s reliance on “perceived common sense” rather than
empirical support).
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making, and family form to guide the formulation of law and policy.3  Some
studies have focused directly on family law issues and the impact of particular
reforms,4 but lawmakers have also drawn on general child development and
other research to inform law and policy.5  This trend toward employing sci-
ence has been critically important in some domains.  For example, research
evidence showing that children raised by same-sex parents fared as well as
children in families with opposite-sex parents played a crucial role in litiga-
tion establishing the right of same-sex couples to marry.6  More broadly,
recent juvenile justice reforms have been heavily influenced by research on
social and biological development,7 and research on early child development
has begun to influence the formulation of policies to support families.8
Lawmakers and scholars have generally embraced the trend toward sci-
entifically informed family law,9 but in recent years, prominent scholars,
3 See Bisbing v. Bisbing, 166 A.3d 1155, 1166–70 (N.J. 2017) (citing extensive social
science research in deciding what rule a trial court should apply in determining whether
relocation is in the best interest of the child).  Much research on adolescent development
has found its way into opinions dealing with interrogation and sentencing of juveniles. See
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 472 n.5 (“The evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that
the science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become
even stronger.”); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 n.5 (2011) (“Although citation
to social science and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary to establish these com-
monsense propositions, the literature confirms what experience bears out.”); infra Section
II.A.  Courts also invoke research in deciding cases, drawing on social science in custody
disputes. See infra text accompanying notes 32–41 (discussing parental alienation
syndrome).
4 See, e.g., Allen & Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws, supra note 1.
5 For discussion of the application of research on adolescent development to youth
justice policy, see infra Section II.A.
6 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760–61 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d
388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown,
671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
U.S. 693 (2013).  See Huntington, supra note 2, at 241–49 for a discussion of the signifi-
cant role empirical research played in the same-sex marriage debate.
7 See discussion infra Section II.A; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013); ELIZABETH
S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 89–119 (2008) (advocating
that juvenile crime regulation be formulated in a developmental framework and describ-
ing evidence of the trend).
8 See Clare Huntington & Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood in the
Twenty-First Century, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); infra text accompanying notes
129–31.
9 See Sanford L. Braver et al., A Randomized Comparative Effectiveness Trial of Two Court-
Connected Programs for High-Conflict Families, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 349 (2016); Huntington, supra
note 2, at 240–66; Huntington & Scott, supra note 8, at 6; Ross A. Thompson, Bridging
Developmental Neuroscience and the Law: Child-Caregiver Relationships, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1443
(2012).  The deployment of developmental and other social science research in youth
crime regulation has received broad support across a range of issues. See infra Section II.A;
see also Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
919 (2016).
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including Brinig herself, have raised concerns about the trend.10  A part of
the criticism is directed at the quality of research sometimes used in this con-
text.  Research design may be flawed and researchers may have biases that
shape outcomes.11  Critics have aptly described some research as “junk sci-
ence”; for example, studies of “parental alienation syndrome” have been dis-
credited but continue to be invoked in divorce custody proceedings.12
Further, legal advocates are charged with deploying research findings selec-
tively in service of their litigation or policy goals.13  Moreover, courts and
other legal actors sometimes lack the sophistication necessary to evaluate the
quality of research or to understand the limits of even well-designed and well-
executed studies for particular legal purposes.14  Solid research about devel-
opmental trends across an age span, for example, may be unhelpful when
applied to individuals.15  And one study, or a handful, is a thin reed on which
to base any rule or policy.16
Skeptics also challenge family law’s turn to empiricism on more funda-
mental grounds.  Most recently, Clare Huntington, while generally
applauding the “empirical turn in family law,”17 has argued that emphasis on
empirical knowledge leads to a focus on outcomes that tends to obscure the
extent to which policy debates are about contested values.18  In these impor-
tant debates, she and others argue empirical knowledge is of limited utility in
assisting us to prioritize competing values and giving undue weight to empir-
ics can distort the values debate.19  Ultimately, critics raise the concern that
10 Margaret F. Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1083, 1084; see
also Robert E. Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence for a Cause: Scholar-Advocacy Bias in Family
Law, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 134 (2016); Huntington, supra note 2, at 232; Sarah H. Ramsey &
Robert F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family Law Analysis and Formation: Problems
and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 631, 643–45 (1994).
11 See infra Section I.A.
12 See infra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 64–65
(2005) (criticizing the Roper Court for ignoring the “rich statistical literature on the deter-
rent effect of capital punishment”); see also Emery et al., supra note 10, at 138–39.
14 See infra Section I.B.
15 See David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testi-
mony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 64–67.
17 Huntington, supra note 2, at 231.
18 See id. at 281–91.
19 Huntington has recently argued this point forcefully. See id. at 289.  But others have
also underscored that value contests that cannot be resolved empirically are at the heart of
many family law debates.  Robert Mnookin famously offered an early articulation. See Rob-
ert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 230 (1975) (explaining that custody decision is
indeterminate because of a lack of consensus about values); id. at 260 (“Deciding what is
best for a child poses a question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life
itself.”).
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the use of empirical knowledge can reinforce bias and harm marginalized
families and communities.20
This Essay acknowledges these criticisms but suggests that many con-
cerns can be alleviated by more careful and sophisticated use of science.  The
application of science to questions of family and juvenile law is a relatively
recent phenomenon.  Legal actors are becoming more skillful in the use of
this tool, which holds extraordinary promise as a means to inform decision-
making and regulation in a way that enhances individual and social welfare.
Moreover, scholars and researchers increasingly have formed interdiscipli-
nary teams to design studies and translate research findings to legal actors.21
The scholarly critique itself is evidence that legal actors are becoming more
sophisticated consumers who are better able to evaluate research and apply it
to family law and policy.  And the adversary process itself exposes weaknesses
in scientific evidence.  Consider the litigation over same-sex marriage; ulti-
mately, the solid research supporting same-sex parents triumphed in the
courts over the flimsy studies offered by opponents.22
The Essay highlights issues on which the introduction of scientific knowl-
edge has resulted in key beneficial reforms; these examples clarify some char-
acteristics of the research most useful in this context.  First, twenty-first
century juvenile justice regulation increasingly has been shaped by develop-
mental science clarifying that teenage offenders differ in important ways
from their adult counterparts.23  Second, policies supporting family preserva-
tion and healthy child development are supported by a large body of
research on child development indicating the importance for child well-
being of stable parent-child relationships.24  This research has been invoked
by scholars defending parental rights of marginalized families.25  Also, longi-
tudinal research on fragile families, together with programmatic studies, has
been influential in supporting early childhood programs.26  These examples
suggest that the empirical work most useful in informing legal policy typically
includes research that has not been undertaken primarily for that purpose,
together with studies examining legally relevant issues.  It also suggests that
lawmakers’ confidence in research should be directly correlated with its
depth and range.
20 Huntington, supra note 2, at 293–95.  State and local child protective authorities are
beginning to make use of algorithms that attempt to predict the likelihood of child mis-
treatment.  For a discussion of the use of predictive analytics in child welfare, see infra
notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 79–90.
22 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015); see also Perry v. Schwarzeneg-
ger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052
(9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
23 See infra text accompanying notes 100–15.
24 See Huntington & Scott, supra note 8, at 68.
25 See id. at 67.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 129–32.
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Finally, the Essay probes the foundational critique of empiricism in fam-
ily law and argues that the threat may be less severe than critics fear.27  To be
sure, values shape family law and policy and competing values often cannot
be prioritized solely (or even largely) on the basis of empirical knowledge.
But values often have empirical content, and accuracy in evaluating the
stakes of a value contest is critically important.  Moreover, the evidence does
not support the concern that answers offered by empirical studies will be
given undue weight in values competitions.  The likely alternative—reliance
on conventional wisdom and assumptions about the world—seems almost
always to be inferior as a basis of prioritizing values in making decisions and
formulating law, and more likely to result in biased calculations harmful to
marginalized families.
I. EVALUATING THE CHALLENGES OF EMPIRICAL SCIENCE IN FAMILY LAW
In general, the application of social science and other empirical
research to family and juvenile law has been welcomed by lawmakers and
scholars.28  It is well accepted that empirical research is useful in assisting in
the construction of law and policy based on an accurate account of relevant
conditions and behavior and in promoting the efficient allocation of scarce
resources.29  But some observers are uneasy—even scholars like Huntington
who generally acknowledge the important and beneficial role of empirical
work in family law.30  Much of the concern about the use of empirical
research in family law fits in one of two interrelated categories.  First, critics
sometimes assail the quality of the research itself or question its fit to doctri-
nal or policy issues.  Second, skeptics raise concerns about a more serious
problem—the ability of courts and legislatures to evaluate research, under-
stand its limitations, and apply it with the necessary sophistication.  This Part
briefly evaluates these concerns and assesses the seriousness of the
problem.31
A. Limitations of Empirical Research
This Section briefly reviews several prominent challenges directed at the
application of research studies to family and juvenile law.  In some instances,
poorly constructed studies have had an important impact on law and deci-
sionmaking.  Researcher bias is also a concern, particularly when studies
focus directly on specific family law issues or implicate political or ideological
27 See infra Part III.
28 See Huntington & Scott, supra note 8, at 21–28 (describing beneficial use of social
science research in modern law regulating children).
29 Id.
30 My coauthored article with Huntington points to this important role. See id. Hunt-
ington’s other work has also drawn heavily on social science research. See generally CLARE
HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014).
31 Clare Huntington has provided an excellent review of the various concerns about
the use of research in family law.  Huntington, supra note 2, at 271–95.
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values.  On the other hand, the findings of research conducted with no pol-
icy agenda may be only tangentially relevant to legal questions and are often
distorted in translation when applied to law.  Finally, the use of algorithms in
child protection and juvenile justice has raised alarm recently, in part
because the incorporated factors lack transparency and may reinforce bias.
Methodological flaws in many studies that have been influential in family
law include very small samples,32 the lack of a control group,33 and sample
selection bias.34  Combining all these defects are studies describing “parental
alienation syndrome” (PAS), a diagnosis that became prominent in child cus-
tody cases in the 1990s.35  PAS was invented and promulgated by psychologist
Richard Gardner, who described a condition in which one parent alienates a
child from the other parent, destroying the parent-child relationship and
grievously harming the child.36  Both courts and legislatures embraced the
importance of PAS in resolving custody disputes, often pointing to Gardner’s
research and testimony.37  Although the scientific aura surrounding PAS
almost surely contributed to the influence of PAS, Gardner’s “research”
failed to conform to the most basic methodological requirements of scientific
studies.  The small sample that formed the basis of his studies consisted of his
32 Early legislative advocates for joint custody pointed to supportive studies, ignoring
small samples. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 455, 455 n.2 (1984) (describing studies); see also DEBORAH ANNA LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUS-
TODY: A STUDY OF FAMILIES AFTER DIVORCE 18 (1982) (eighteen parents with joint-custody
arrangements, sixteen custodial mothers, and sixteen custodial fathers); Alice Abarbanel,
Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study of Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIA-
TRY 320, 320 (1979) (four families); Judith Brown Greif, Fathers, Children, and Joint Custody,
49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 311, 311 (1979) (forty fathers, eight with joint custody); Susan
Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement: A Report of a Study, 51 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403, 403 (1981) (twenty-four families).
33 See infra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the Wallerstein and Kelly study
of the impact of divorce on children).
34 See infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing studies of children raised by gay
parents).
35 For descriptions and critiques of PAS, see generally Carol S. Bruch, Parental Aliena-
tion Syndrome and Parental Alienation: Getting It Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 FAM. L.Q. 527
(2001); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling
Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014, at 69; Cheri L.
Wood, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1367 (1994).
36 See RICHARD A. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME (2d ed. 1998); Rich-
ard A. Gardner, Legal and Psychotherapeutic Approaches to the Three Types of Parental Alienation
Syndrome Families: When Psychiatry and the Law Join Forces, CT. REV., Spring 1991, at 14; Rich-
ard A. Gardner, Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation, ACAD. F., Summer 1985, at 3.
37 See, e.g., J.F. v. L.F., 694 N.Y.S.2d 592, 599–600 (Fam. Ct. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Faneca
v. Faneca, 705 N.Y.S.2d 281 (App. Div. 2000); Karen B. v. Clyde M., 574 N.Y.S.2d 267, 271
(Fam. Ct. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Karen “PP” v. Clyde “QQ,” 602 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div.
1993).  Motivated by concern about the harm to children of parental alienation, several
states enacted “friendly parent” statutes, which disfavor a parent who has undermined the
child’s relationship with the other parent. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(a), (j) (West
2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(6)–(7) (West 2019).
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male clients who had lost custody of their children in contentious disputes;
Gardner never interviewed the children or mothers in his studies.38  Less
egregious variations of this problem plagued early research on the harm of
divorce on children.  Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly’s famous study
describing the harms experienced by the children of divorce involved a
clinical sample of children in therapy, whose parents were divorcing, with no
control sample.39  A few studies involving a handful of families played an
outsize role in the legislative movement to promote joint custody.40  Finally,
research on the outcomes of children raised by gay and lesbian parents has of
necessity involved mostly educated, middle-class parents; thus, findings could
not be generalized confidently across demographic groups.41
Researchers studying family law issues sometimes have a personal inter-
est in the subject matter of the research or have political or ideological lean-
ings that favor some outcomes over others.  Some research in this category is
methodologically sound.  Studies of children’s outcomes in families with
same-sex parents largely has been undertaken by respected researchers who
happened to be lesbian,42 and top-notch, though politically progressive,
researchers have studied juvenile crime.43  But research designed to address
particular family law issues, from the impact of joint-custody arrangements
and importance of contact with noncustodial fathers,44 to the benefits of no-
38 See sources cited supra note 36.
39 Wallerstein and Kelly’s study on the impact of divorce on children drew conclusions
from a sample of 131 children in sixty white, upper-middle-class, divorced families who had
sought out counseling.  JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 4–5 (1980).  For criticism of the
Wallerstein-Kelly study, see Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 10, at 643 (explaining how the
researchers’ small “convenience sample[ ]” was “likely to be biased, that is, not representa-
tive of the population to which the researcher[s] wishe[d] to generalize”).
40 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., Timothy J. Biblarz & Evren Savci, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
Families, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 480, 482 (2010) (“Most of the patterns above describe
samples of lesbian families that are disproportionately middle class, White, and highly edu-
cated.”); Rachel H. Farr & Charlotte J. Patterson, Coparenting Among Lesbian, Gay, and Heter-
osexual Couples: Associations with Adopted Children’s Outcomes, 84 CHILD DEV. 1226, 1229
(2013) (“Most parents [participating in the study] were well educated, worked full-time,
and had family incomes above national averages.”).
42 Charlotte Patterson and Nanette Gartrell are lesbian researchers. Charlotte J. Pat-
terson, Same-Sex Marriage and the Interests of Children: Comments on Michael Wald’s “Same-Sex
Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective,” 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 345, 345 (2001)
(describing her coming out); Dee Mosbacher, Nanette Gartrell, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/16/fashion/weddings/dee-mosbacher-nanette-gar-
trell.html (announcing Nanette Gartrell’s marriage to Diane Mosbacher).
43 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 93 (1990).
44 Fathers’-rights advocates often cite studies that purport to show child outcomes are
better in joint-custody arrangements than in sole-custody arrangements. See, e.g., Sanford
L. Braver et al., Relocation of Children After Divorce and Children’s Best Interests: New Evidence
and Legal Considerations, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 206, 214 (2003); Linda Nielsen, Shared Physical
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fault divorce,45 is often shadowed by the suspicion that the views of the
researcher have shaped research design or interpretation of findings.46  This
concern affects policy-driven research generally, but family law research may
be particularly vulnerable because the nature of the subject matter implicates
intimate personal matters so directly.
Research that may have relevance to law but is not conducted for a spe-
cific policy purpose does not intrinsically pose the risk of bias.  But because
this research is not tailored to answer legal questions, it can pose other chal-
lenges when applied by legal actors.  Researchers without a legal or policy
goal may fail to frame questions in ways most useful for legal purposes or fail
to ask important questions altogether.  Methodologically sound research typi-
cally probes narrow questions, excluding confounding variables.  Findings
are similarly narrow, and good researchers carefully describe the limitations
of the research findings.  But when research findings are applied in legal
settings, precision and qualification are often lost as advocates, courts, and
scholars predictably extrapolate, exaggerate, and oversimplify.47  For exam-
ple, neuroscientists have studied social and emotional brain development in
adolescents and young adults without consideration of the implications for
criminal justice policy.  Courts, scholars, and advocates have linked this
research to legal policy, often very usefully,48 but sometimes exaggerate its
relevance and importance.49
The use of algorithms in family and juvenile law represents another
form of empirical input that has become widespread, often guiding decisions
about intervention in child protection cases as well as risk assessment of
Custody: Summary of 40 Studies on Outcomes for Children, 55 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 613,
631–32 (2014).
45 See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why
Reformers Should Look Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 216
(1997).
46 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Thoughts on the Liberal Dilemma in Child Welfare Reform,
24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 726–27 (2016) (offering this criticism of researchers favor-
ing family preservation policies and describing a “corrupt policy-research merger”).
47 Emery et al., supra note 10, at 134 (criticism of scholar-advocates).  We return to this
problem in the next Section.
48 Developmental brain research was invoked by the Supreme Court in the juvenile
sentencing opinions. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012) (“Our deci-
sions [in Roper and Graham] rested not only on common sense—on what ‘any parent
knows’—but on science and social science as well. . . . We reasoned that [scientific] find-
ings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both
lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by
and neurological development occurs, his ‘deficiencies will be reformed.’” (first quoting
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); and then quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 68 (2010))); see also Elizabeth Scott et al., Brain Development, Social Context, and Justice
Policy, 57 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13 (2018) (describing policy proposals on recent research
into brain development).
49 Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social
Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2016) (criticizing use of brain science by
advocates for treating young adults in justice system as juveniles).
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youth in the justice system.50  Algorithms have become controversial as a
usurpation of human judgment.  Another criticism, addressed below, is that
algorithms reinforce biases by using factors such as police contact, child wel-
fare involvement, and others that themselves may be grounded in biased
decisions and policies.51
B. Legal Actors as Consumers: Problems of Translation and Application
Much of the misuse of empirical research in family law can be attributed
to the adversarial setting in which empirical work is often deployed and/or to
the lack of sophistication of legal actors.  A part of the problem historically
has been that legal training has not provided tools to distinguish solid
research from that of little value.  Today, however, lawyers are getting more
sophisticated, and a greater concern is directed at misapplication of method-
ologically sound research.  Lawyers as advocates in adjudication, but also in
the legislative and regulatory processes, are sometimes motivated to invoke
and sometimes distort any available empirical support for their legal posi-
tions, regardless of the merit of the research or whether application is appro-
priate to inform the legal dispute.52  Whether the use of flawed research or
misuse of solid studies is effective depends in part on the sophistication of
opposing advocates; it also depends on the ability of courts evaluating the
research to disregard weak studies.  Selective use of favorable studies, while
ignoring inconsistent findings (“cherry picking”)53; exaggeration of the
importance of one study (or a small number); oversimplification and over-
statement of findings;54 and application of findings from group research to
50 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text; see also DEV. SERVS. GRP., INC., RISK
AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS FOR YOUTHS 5–6 (2015), https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/
RiskandNeeds.pdf; RHEMA VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., VULNERABLE CHILDREN: CAN ADMINISTRA-




51 See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
52 Emery et al., supra note 10; Irwin Sandler et al., Convenient and Inconvenient Truths in
Family Law: Preventing Scholar-Advocacy Bias in the Use of Social Science Research for Public Policy,
54 FAM. CT. REV. 150 (2016).
53 In his Roper v. Simmons dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for “picking and
choosing [studies] that support[ed] its position.”  543 U.S. 551, 616–17 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).  “In other words,” Scalia argued, “all the Court has done today, to borrow from
another context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends.” Id. at 617.
Similarly, Judge Posner has argued that the Roper majority ignored the “rich statistical liter-
ature on the deterrent effect of capital punishment” and relied on studies that did not in
fact support a “categorical exclusion of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds from the ranks of
the mature.”  Posner, supra note 13, at 64–65; see also Emery et al., supra note 10, at 138
(describing cherry picking in use of research in family law).
54 See Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnos-
tic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006); see also Scott et al., supra note 49, at 664 (discuss-
ing the uncertainties that remain in developmental neuroscience research and the need to
avoid exaggeration); id. (“Some reformers have pointed to neuroscience and other
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individual cases in litigation55 provide little valuable information and can
undermine the adjudicative process.  Unless these tactics are exposed, the
science can be given undeserved weight.  Moreover, this problem is amplified
in family court because expert scientific testimony is not subject to screening
in that context,56 and judges often do not have clerks or other resources to
examine the validity of studies offered.  This may explain the lingering shelf
life of PAS long after it was thoroughly debunked by scientists.
In the legislative and regulatory arena, advocates may misuse research
findings in ways similar to its use in litigation when seeking to influence
lawmakers for or against proposed legislation or regulation.  In these con-
texts, however, there is more opportunity for a range of opinions to be heard
and more time for deliberation.  Moreover, legislative and agency staff can
undertake their own investigations into the quality and quantity of empirical
support for reforms.57  In general, it would seem uncontroversial that solid
empirical evidence can usefully inform legislative and regulatory lawmaking;
not surprisingly, scientific input has increased substantially in recent decades
at the federal and state levels.58  Nonetheless, some legislative reform move-
ments have become highly politicized and scientific research has been mis-
used by partisans.  Fathers’-rights advocates pressing state legislatures to
enact statutes favoring joint custody often made questionable use of social
science studies in promoting their position.59
research in advocating that young adults be adjudicated in the juvenile system.  But the
research supporting the presumption underlying the lenient, rehabilitative approach of
the juvenile system—that youthful offending is driven by developmental immaturity—is
weaker for young adults.” (footnote omitted)).
55 See Faigman et al., supra note 15.
56 For a discussion of family courts’ failure to apply Daubert, see Scott & Emery, supra
note 35, at 99–100; and see also Huntington, supra note 2, at 256–57.
57 Both Congress and some state legislatures have agencies that conduct research.
ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34306, VULNERABLE YOUTH:
FEDERAL MENTORING PROGRAMS AND ISSUES (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34306
.pdf (reviewing studies on the success of mentoring programs for vulnerable youth).  Wash-
ington State has an independent research agency that undertakes studies for the legisla-
ture, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY
& EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE INST., UNIV. OF WASH., UPDATED INVENTORY OF EVIDENCE-
BASED, RESEARCH-BASED, AND PROMISING PRACTICES: FOR PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND JUVENILES IN THE CHILD WELFARE, JUVENILE JUSTICE, AND
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEMS (2018), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1698/Wsipp_Up
dated-Inventory-of-Evidence-Based-Research-Based-and-Promising-Practices-For-Preven-
tion-and-Intervention-Services-for-Children-and-Juveniles-in-the-Child-Welfare-Juvenile-Jus-
tice-and-Mental-Health-Systems_Report.pdf (assessing whether prevention and
intervention practices are evidence based by conducting quantitative reviews of the
research literature).
58 See FERNANDES-ALCANTARA, supra note 57, at 17; WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY
& EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE INST., UNIV. OF WASH., supra note 57.
59 See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV.
497, 506–11 (1988) (criticizing proponents of joint custody for relying on empirical
research involving small, nonrepresentative samples).
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Three examples of questionable uses of scientific research illustrate the
complexity of the problems that can arise and the sophistication required to
identify and challenge misuse.  The first is known as the G2i problem, the
application of research conducted on groups of subjects to individuals.60
Researchers on adolescent brain development, for example, have found that
social and emotional maturation proceeds slowly during adolescence and
into early adulthood.61  However, these general findings cannot be used to
assess a particular defendant’s brain development.62  Thus, defense attorneys
who introduce a brain scan as evidence of a young defendant’s immaturity go
beyond the boundary of science.  Research studies on demographic groups
can inform policies affecting the group as a whole and can be offered in
litigation as “framework” evidence about the group of which the defendant is
a member, but findings cannot be applied to an individual within the
cohort.63
The second problem involves the use of legally relevant, methodologi-
cally sound research findings that ultimately prove not to be generalizable to
other settings, despite apparent similarities.  A famous example was the study
by Lawrence Sherman that found that the arrest of men in Minneapolis
accused of domestic violence (rather than informal resolution of their cases)
reduced recidivism.64  Relying on this study, many localities thereafter
adopted policies favoring arrest.65  But follow-up studies in other cities failed
to replicate the early findings and found that sometimes arrest was followed
60 Faigman et al., supra note 15, at 420.
61 Kathryn Monahan et al., Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice: A Developmental Perspective,
44 CRIME & JUST. 577, 580–87 (2015).
62 Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 134 (2007) (“For a variety of reasons, most neuroscientists and legal
scholars are skeptical that brain imaging techniques can diagnose mental conditions in
individual offenders.  Among other reasons, they cite the lack of in-depth knowledge of the
range of variance in normal brain structure and function, the extent to which networks in
the brain either compensate for, or are affected by, pathologies at any particular node, and
the current deficiency of empirical evidence linking brain structure and in vitro function
(i.e., performance on simple tasks while in the MRI machine) to specific behaviors in vivo
(i.e., in real life).”).
63 Faigman et al., supra note 15, at 425 (“[T]he decision whether to admit expert testi-
mony regarding the empirical framework is separate from the decision whether to admit
expert testimony offering an opinion that a particular case is an instance of that empirical
framework. . . . Even if framework evidence is admissible, extrapolation from it to the
individual case may not be scientifically or legally justifiable.”).
64 Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261, 270 (1984).  Brinig describes this example in her
critique of the use of empirical research in family law.  Brinig, supra note 10, at 1095–96.
65 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy: The
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 117 (1989) (finding over
a third of respondents from 117 U.S. police departments had been influenced by the
experiment); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 62 (1992).
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by increased recidivism rates.66  Ultimately Sherman and others concluded
that the key factor rationalizing the different outcomes was whether accused
men were employed and had ties to the community.  Those individuals likely
were deterred from reoffending by the threat of losing their jobs or of the
reputational harm attending arrest; others probably were not, and arrest
increased their hostility and violent behavior.67  The lesson from this account
is that a single study almost never provides a sufficient basis for an important
legal reform.
A third potentially problematic application of science involves the use of
algorithms in guiding child-welfare and juvenile-justice decisions.  These
algorithms basically combine factors to create risk-assessment instruments
that potentially facilitate more scientifically based decisions in these domains.
Child protective service agencies use algorithms known as predictive analytics
to determine whether intervention or investigation of a family is warranted,
sometimes leading to a decision of whether the child should remain in the
home or be removed due to the threat posed by parental abuse.68  Courts
and regulators also use risk-assessment instruments to evaluate young offend-
ers in making dispositional decisions.69  In both contexts, the instruments
hold promise but also may carry the risk of overprediction of harm due to
bias in the construction of the algorithms.  Critics argue that child welfare
algorithms are biased against families of color who have had contact with the
system, often initiated by financial need.70  Risk-assessment instruments
66 After the initial Sherman study was published, the National Institute of Justice con-
ducted five large-scale, long-term replication studies in five different cities: Omaha, Mil-
waukee, Charlotte, Miami, and Colorado Springs.  The study found that in cities with high
levels of poverty and in homes suffering from unemployment, arrest actually increased
rather than decreased domestic-violence recidivism rates. See Janell D. Schmidt & Law-
rence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic Violence?, 36 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 601, 605–06
(1993) (summarizing findings of the replication studies).
67 See id.; Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers:
The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 162 (1992)
(suggesting that employed arrestees might be deterred out of fear of losing their jobs).
68 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 2, at 259–63; Marquis Cabrera, Florida Leverages
Predictive Analytics to Prevent Child Fatalities—Other States Follow, HUFFPOST (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/florida-leverages-predictive_b_8586712?guccounter=1;
Laura Santhanam, Can Big Data Save These Children?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 22, 2016),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/can-big-data-save-these-children; see also supra
notes 127–28.
69 See, e.g., CHRIS BAIRD ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, A COMPARI-
SON OF RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 7–9 (2013), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/244477.pdf; John Kelly, Florida’s New Predictive Risk Tool Likely
to Drive Down Juvenile Incarceration, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (June 23, 2015), https://chron-
icleofsocialchange.org/featured/floridas-new-predictive-risk-tool-likely-to-drive-down-juve-
nile-incarceration/10505.
70 See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017) (criticizing use of algorithms in context of Medicaid
policy and decisions); see also Stephanie K. Glaberson, Coding over the Cracks: Predictive Ana-
lytics and Child Protection, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 310 (2019).  Glaberson argues that
biased data sets can inadvertently reinforce bias:
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applied to young offenders are charged with incorporating the racial and
socioeconomic biases inherent in policing, prosecution, and other aspects of
criminal justice policy in this country.71  These biases may be invisible to
exposure, in part because many algorithms used by state actors are created by
private developers who maintain copyright protection.72  Thus, although
algorithms potentially can improve accuracy in risk assessment as compared
to human decisionmakers, potential biases can undermine these benefits.
C. How Serious Is the Problem?
The preceding discussion supports the concern that flawed research can
find its way into family law settings, and that decisionmakers sometimes rely
on empirical work in ways that fail to promote accuracy.  The problem to an
extent is more acute in family law than in some other fields because many
family court judges lack resources to allow careful evaluation of empirical
support for litigants’ positions.  Nonetheless, on my view, the problem of
inappropriate use of science in legal contexts is declining as the sophistica-
tion of legal actors increases—and this trend is likely to continue.  As indi-
cated above, the many incisive critiques of the misuse of science offer
evidence of progress toward this goal.  Misuse continues, but today it is more
likely to be exposed than previously.  Parental alienation syndrome has been
thoroughly debunked by social scientists and legal scholars.73  Litigants,
drawing on this literature, can educate judges about the flaws in the research
when presented by opposing counsel.  As a result, although misuse of PAS
continues, it is less frequently invoked in custody proceedings today than pre-
viously.74  Generally, the adversary process allows contestants to test each
[A] long history of over-surveillance and over-policing of poor communities and
communities of color means that those communities are disproportionately rep-
resented in any child welfare or criminal justice data set.  This means that, with-
out careful attention to the details of tool development and training, algorithms
trained on these biased data sets are likely to rate individuals coming from these
communities as higher risk, while systematically discounting the risk of wealthier,
white families.
Id. at 345.
71 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27
FED. SENT’G REP. 237 (2015); Rachael T. Perrault et al., Are Risk Assessments Racially Biased?:
Field Study of the SAVRY and YLS/CMI in Probation, 29 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 664, 665 (2017).
72 Christopher E. Church & Amanda J. Fairchild, In Search of a Silver Bullet: Child Wel-
fare’s Embrace of Predictive Analytics, 68 JUV. & FAM. CT. J., no. 1, 2017, at 67, 73–76 (discuss-
ing the lack of transparency caused by the proprietary nature of algorithms and the
potential for due process infringements).
73 See supra text accompanying notes 32–41; see also Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson,
Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse
and Alienation, 35 LAW & INEQ. 311, 317 (2017).
74 “Parental alienation” (PA) as a behavior pattern seems to have displaced PAS in
courts, reducing the diagnostic mystique, likely because of the mountain of research
debunking PAS. See Meier & Dickson, supra note 73, at 317.  However, opponents assert
that PA is the same junk science by another name. See id.
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other’s scientific evidence effectively.75  The key role of dueling studies in the
litigation over same-sex couples’ right to marry demonstrates how the quality
of research can be exposed in litigation.76  In the legislative and regulatory
context, the opportunity for vetting and analyzing empirical evidence allows
lawmakers and their staffs to deliberate over the relevance of scientific stud-
ies to the issue at hand.  The failure of the Sherman domestic-violence study
to predict outcomes in cities with different demographics is now well under-
stood, although its impact lingers in some localities.77  Moreover, in Wash-
ington State and other jurisdictions, legislatures have the benefit of agencies
constituted to conduct and evaluate research relevant to legislative issues.78
Developments in the past generation bode well for future application of
empirical research to family law and policy.  Particularly promising is the
growing collaboration between social scientists and legal scholars in design-
ing and conducting research and in analyzing the relevance of empirical
work to legal issues.  Law itself has become an interdisciplinary field.  Increas-
ingly, entry-level candidates for law school faculty positions have training in
75 Faigman et al., supra note 15, at 472.  A recent example involves the use of research
on adolescent brain maturation in cases of individual juvenile defendants.  Scientists
quickly objected that this use was inappropriate, and litigants brought this objection into
the courtroom. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.  Even in family court, liti-
gants and judges likely do a better job today of challenging misuse of research, although
the absence of screening of scientific experts’ testimony in that forum puts a greater bur-
den on opponents and judges to expose the misuse of research.  Emery et al., supra note
10, at 145.
76 In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, proponents of same-sex marriage produced several expert
witnesses who testified on the well-being of children raised by same-sex parents.  704 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 938–43 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).  The
state produced an expert witness who gave opinions on the outcomes of children raised by
married, biological parents compared to those raised in other environments. Id. at
948–49.  The court rejected the expert’s conclusion that married biological parents
formed a better child-rearing environment, determining that the studies that he relied
upon did not actually compare the outcomes of children raised by their biological parents
with those raised by same-sex parents. Id.
77 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  Sherman himself advocated for the
repeal of mandatory arrest laws based on this evidence, id., but today, twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia still impose some form of mandatory arrest policy for domestic
violence. See Amy M. Zelcer, Battling Domestic Violence: Replacing Mandatory Arrest Laws with
a Trifecta of Preferential Arrest, Officer Education, and Batterer Treatment Programs, 51 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 541, 546 (2014).
78 See supra note 57 for discussion of the Washington State Institute of Public Policy
(WSIPP), which advises the state legislature on issues involving social legislation; see also
ELIZABETH DRAKE, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DECLINING
JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION OF YOUTH (2013), https://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/
1544/Wsipp_The-Effectiveness-of-Declining-Juvenile-Court-Jurisdiction-of-Youth_Report
.pdf (evaluating the effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis of transferring juvenile cases to
adult criminal court).
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other disciplines79 such as economics and psychology, or learn as autodidacts
to be smart consumers.  Much legal scholarship today draws on knowledge
from other disciplines, and legal training also has become more interdiscipli-
nary.80  Moreover, many social scientists have focused their attention on legal
issues as part of a research agenda.81
Productive interdisciplinary collaborations abound in family law.  Peg
Brinig’s collaborations with Douglas Allen, Steven Nock, and (more recently)
Marsha Garrison represent a model of good interdisciplinary work that has
illuminated important questions.82  On a larger scale, the National Academy
of Sciences has convened interdisciplinary committees that have produced
reports on issues such as juvenile justice and young adulthood.83  Also, the
MacArthur Foundation research networks focusing on juvenile justice,
neuroscience and criminal law, and early childhood have brought together
scientists, legal scholars, and practitioners.84  Working over periods of several
79 See, e.g., Blake Edwards, The Age of the PhD Law Professor Is Upon Us, Study Says,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 19, 2016), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/
the-age-of-the-phd-law-professor-is-upon-us-study-says.
80 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1217
(2002). For discussions of interdisciplinary legal training, see generally Linda Morton et
al., Teaching Interdisciplinary Collaboration: Theory, Practice, and Assessment, 13 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 175 (2010) (describing interdisciplinary approach to teaching health law);
Mike Townsend & Thomas Richardson, Probability and Statistics in the Legal Curriculum: A
Case Study in Disciplinary Aspects of Interdisciplinarity, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 447 (2002); Anita Wein-
berg & Carol Harding, Interdisciplinary Teaching and Collaboration in Higher Education: A Con-
cept Whose Time Has Come, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 15 (2004).
81 Robert Emery, a psychologist, has done important work on divorce mediation,
sometimes in collaboration with legal scholars. See, e.g., ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION (2d ed. 2012); Scott &
Emery, supra note 35.  Other psychologists have paid attention to juvenile development
and within legal frameworks. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Is an Adolescent an Adult?
Assessing Cognitive Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549
(2016); N. Dickon Reppucci & Catherine A. Crosby, Law, Psychology, and Children: Overarch-
ing Issues, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1993); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent
Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221 (1995).
82 See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should Cohabitation Be the
(Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403 (2004); sources cited supra note 1.  This author’s
collaborative work has also been productive and was cited by the Supreme Court in the
juvenile sentencing opinions. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–73 (2005) (citing
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1009, 1014 (2003)); see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7.
83 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7.
84 See, e.g., Research Network on Adolescent Development & Juvenile Justice, MACARTHUR
FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/networks/research-network-on-adolescent-develop-
ment-juvenil/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019); Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, MACAR-
THUR FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/networks/research-network-on-law-and-neuro
science/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (listing the network’s membership, which includes
judges, professors of psychology and psychiatry, economists, neuroscientists, and legal
academics).
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years, these networks have identified key research issues, conducted studies,
and disseminated findings to courts and policymakers.
The Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice
provides a model of interdisciplinary policy-relevant research.  In the mid-
1990s, in response to a punitive wave of policy reforms, the MacArthur Foun-
dation created the network, which conducted an important program of
developmental and justice-system research on young offenders over a ten-
year period.  The foundation then funded Models for Change, which oper-
ated in several states to promote policy change based on the work of the
network.85  The foundation later supported developmental brain research
through its interdisciplinary Research Network on Law and Neuroscience.86
The work of the MacArthur research networks is seen as an important catalyst
for the widespread adoption of juvenile justice reforms grounded in develop-
mental knowledge over the past decade.87
These developments have contributed to a generation of lawyers who are
more sophisticated consumers of empirical science and to dialogue between
legal and social science (and biological science) experts that has enhanced
the law’s comprehension of what constitutes good research.88  Further, inter-
disciplinary research teams have identified the key questions in legal policy,
designed sound studies grounded in an understanding of the law, and tested
the impact of legal reforms.89  Moreover, researchers and legal scholars play
85 See About, MODELS FOR CHANGE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/index
.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
86 See Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, supra note 84.
87 See, e.g., Marsha Levick, Through Rose-Colored Glasses: The Twenty-First Century Juvenile
Court, 42 HUM. RTS., no. 3, 2017, at 23, 24 (“[O]ur careening toward an ever-harsher puni-
tive response to juvenile offending crashed into a wall of research at the beginning of this
century, produced by the MacArthur Foundation’s Research Network on Adolescent
Development and Juvenile Justice, which linked the psychological and neurological devel-
opmental differences between juveniles and adults to related differences in criminal culpa-
bility.”).  Articles that grew out of the work of the network were cited in both Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its studies
continue to play a role in lower court decisions extending the Roper and Miller decisions to
individuals older than eighteen. See Laurence Steinberg, Understanding Adolescent Develop-
ment, Reforming Juvenile Justice, MACARTHUR FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.macfound
.org/press/40-years-40-stories/research-network-adolescent-development-and-juvenile-jus-
tice/.
88 See Emery et al., supra note 10, at 136–37.
89 Before undertaking a program of research, the Research Network on Adolescent
Development and Juvenile Justice devoted much time in interdisciplinary dialogue to
determine the most important research questions in juvenile justice, as well as in the
design of studies to answer those questions and plans for translation and dissemination of
the results of research to legal actors. See Research Network on Adolescent Development & Juve-
nile Justice, supra note 84.
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an important role in clarifying the relevance of science to particular legal
questions and explaining the challenges of translating science to law.90
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AT WORK: TWO CASE STUDIES.
This Part describes two domains in which empirical research has had an
important impact in shaping family and juvenile law and policy, resulting in
positive reforms.  The first is juvenile justice policy, where developmental and
other research has reshaped the law’s approach to young offenders.  In the
second legal setting, defining the state’s relationship to the family, the role of
research has been more complex and its potential is unrealized to an extent.
In both areas, policy change has been driven by a combination of general
developmental and family research undertaken with no legal agenda and a
broad range of studies targeting specific legal topics, as well as programmatic
research evaluating outcomes of various programs.
A. A Developmental Model of Juvenile Justice Reform
Social and biological science has probably been more influential in shap-
ing reforms of juvenile justice policy in the twenty-first century than in other
domains related to family law.  In the 1990s, lawmakers enacted punitive law
reforms that discounted the importance of differences between juvenile and
adult offenders.91  Since that time, youth crime regulation has been trans-
formed, such that today support for differential treatment of young offenders
on the basis of their immaturity is embraced across the political spectrum.92
Research on adolescent development, and particularly developmental brain
research, has perhaps been most influential in these policy reforms and has
been applied to a broad array of issues.  Other research has compared the
performance of youths and adults in particular justice-system contexts, clari-
fying the disadvantages of immaturity.93  Finally, researchers have studied the
cost and effectiveness of different correctional programs and placements,
resulting in a major shift from institutional placement to community-based
dispositions.
Much of the developmental research that has influenced lawmakers
reforming youth crime regulation was not undertaken with any legal pur-
pose, although interdisciplinary scholars have often served as translators,
clarifying its relevance.94  A key catalyst for this developmental approach to
90 See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 10 (discussing the limitations and perils of using empiri-
cal research in family law and suggesting areas for future research); see also sources cited
supra note 1; Steinberg & Scott, supra note 82.
91 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra
note 7.
92 See Huntington & Scott, supra note 8, at 28 (discussing conservative group Right on
Crime’s support of developmentally based juvenile justice reforms).
93 See infra text accompanying notes 100–04.
94 See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 82.  These authors applied general developmental
knowledge on adolescence to the question of whether young offenders are less culpable
than adult counterparts under conventional criminal law theories of mitigation. Id.  The
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL404.txt unknown Seq: 19 15-APR-20 15:17
2020] in  defense  of  empiricism  in  family  law 1525
reform was the invocation of behavioral and brain research by the Supreme
Court in its Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing opinions.95  Fortuitously,
the Court’s use of developmental research in these opinions directed
lawmakers’ attention to empirical studies on adolescence at a time when the
body of research, particularly brain research, was growing dramatically.  The
research has motivated sentencing and parole reforms96 and also influenced
courts’ evaluation of the voluntariness of youths’ confessions,97 as well as the
constitutionality of solitary confinement and sex-offender registries for juve-
nile offenders.98  Prominent national organizations also fostered reform,
including the National Academy of Sciences, which issued an influential
report on the importance of developmental science in juvenile justice
reform.99
Developmental brain research has shaped justice policy in key ways.
First, the research has reinforced the premise that juveniles are less culpable
than their adult counterparts, because much teenage offending is influenced
by developmental factors beyond the control of the individual youth.100
Teenage criminal choices are linked to interrelated features of brain devel-
opment, including a tendency toward sensation seeking, a reduced capacity
to regulate emotions as compared to adults, and a greater susceptibility to
peer influence.101  Second, developmental research confirms that typical
adolescent offenders have the potential to reform.102 Because juvenile crime
Supreme Court adopted their framework in the Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing
opinions.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70, 573 (2005); Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 471 (2012). See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7.
95 See generally Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. at 471;
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70, 573.
96 See Elizabeth Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88
TEMP. L. REV. 675, 703–12 (2016) (discussing sentencing and parole reforms already taken
and opportunities for future reform).
97 See A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 801 n.11 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing empirical research
to assert that an eleven-year-old defendant would have been unable to understand the
concepts of Miranda rights and waiver); In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 224 (Ct. App.
2015) (finding confession by a thirteen-year-old involuntary, citing empirical research); In
re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 135 (Wis. 2005) (citing empirical research to show juveniles
are “less capable than adults of understanding their Miranda rights”).
98 See A.T. ex rel. Tillman v. Harder, 298 F. Supp. 3d 391, 411 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (grant-
ing preliminary injunction against juvenile solitary confinement, based on part on the
“large and growing body of research that confirms the use of solitary on juveniles is actually
counterproductive to the penological goals of facility safety and security”); In re Z.B., 757
N.W.2d 595, 611 (S.D. 2008) (Sabers, J., dissenting in part) (citing empirical research to
argue that juveniles should be treated differently under sex-offender registry statutes).
99 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7.
100 See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 82, at 1009.
101 See Scott et al., supra note 48, at 20–33 (summarizing the relevant brain research);
see also Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity in the
Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F2 (2011) (describing developments in
the social brain); Cohen et al., supra note 81, at 550, 559–60.
102 See LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF
ADOLESCENCE 18–45 (2014).
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is typically a product of immaturity, most delinquent youths are likely to
desist as they mature to adulthood103 and have reasonable prospects of
becoming productive adults.104  This realization has focused attention on the
importance of correctional responses that facilitate the transition of delin-
quent youths to noncriminal adulthood.
Reinforcing this response is another body of developmental research
confirming the importance of social context for healthy maturation during
adolescence.105  A healthy social context provides the conditions for the
attainment of skills and capacities that are important to successful adult func-
tioning,106 but social context can also impede healthy maturation.  Modern
regulators increasingly have embraced the lessons of this research, reducing
incarceration (which tends to offer a poor social context for develop-
ment),107 and shifting resources to community-based programs that provide
better conditions and interventions more likely to promote healthy
development.108
This general behavioral and biological research on adolescence has
been augmented by interdisciplinary studies targeting dimensions of adoles-
cent decisionmaking relevant to involvement in criminal activity and to par-
ticipation in the criminal process.  In the MacArthur research networks,
teams of neuroscientists and legal scholars studied adolescent and adult
choices implicating the features of brain development likely relevant to
103 Offending peaks at age seventeen and is then followed by a steep decline in crimi-
nal activity. See Alex R. Piquero et al., The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359,
370 (2003).
104 The Supreme Court noted juveniles’ potential for reform in its Eighth Amendment
opinions. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
105 See Leah H. Somerville et al., A Time of Change: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of
Adolescent Sensitivity to Appetitive and Aversive Environmental Cues, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 124,
130–31 (2010).
106 See Laurence Steinberg et al., Reentry of Young Offenders from the Justice System: A Devel-
opmental Perspective, 2 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 21, 25–26 (2004).  These conditions
include an authoritative parent figure, contact with prosocial peers, and opportunities for
autonomous decisionmaking and critical thinking.  See Urie Bronfenbrenner & Pamela A.
Morris, The Bioecological Model of Human Development, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
793, 822 (Richard M. Lerner ed., 6th ed. 2006); B. Bradford Brown & James Larson, Peer
Relationships in Adolescence, in 2 HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 74, 95 (Richard M.
Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 3d ed. 2009); Laurence Steinberg, We Know Some
Things: Parent-Adolescent Relationships in Retrospect and Prospect, 11 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 1,
7, 14–15 (2001) [hereinafter Steinberg, We Know Some Things].
107 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 32.
108 The most effective programs seek to empower parents to fulfill their role more
effectively and when that is not possible to substitute other adult parent figures who can
provide structure and support to delinquent youths.  These programs facilitate prosocial
peer interactions as well, providing youths with the tools to avoid the influence of antiso-
cial peers in school and in the community setting.  They also provide a range of other
interventions that support youths, respond to their needs, and assist them in acquiring the
skills they need to make the transition to adulthood. See Steinberg, We Know Some Things,
supra note 106, at 15–16.
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engagement in criminal activity, and reported significant differences between
adolescents and adults.109  Other scientists have compared adolescents’ and
adults’ comprehension of Miranda warnings and competence to participate
in the adjudicative process.110  These studies, informed by the general devel-
opmental research, support the conclusion that youthful offending is devel-
opmentally driven and that youths, due to their immaturity, are seriously
disadvantaged in navigating the justice system.111  Courts have cited this
research in extending special protections to youths in the system.112
Research on various juvenile correctional programs has also shaped jus-
tice-system reforms.  Researchers have studied the effectiveness of different
programs and sanctions in reducing reoffending and found some commu-
nity-based programs to be much more effective than incarceration, at a far
lower cost.113  These studies, together with research on social context114 and
on the harms associated with incarcerating youths, have led states to close
institutional facilities and shift resources to communities to fund evidence-
based programs that promise better outcomes.115  This trend away from
incarceration affects a broad category of youths in the justice system and is
one of the most important of the twenty-first-century reforms grounded in
empirical research.
109 This research was reported in Cohen et al., supra note 81, at 550, 559–60.
110 Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980); Thomas Grisso et. al, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A
Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
333 (2003); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 820–27 (2005).
111 A major study on adjudicative competence found that a substantial percentage of
youths under age sixteen lack competence to proceed under standards applied to adult
defendants.  Grisso et al., supra note 110, at 333. Several studies have found that the ability
to understand Miranda warnings is compromised in minors age fifteen and younger.
Grisso, supra note 110, at 1135–36.
112 See, e.g., In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 224 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Grisso’s
research in finding confession by juvenile involuntary); In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110,
135 n.47 (Wis. 2005) (citing Grisso’s research in adopting a requirement that all custodial
interrogations of juveniles must be electronically recorded where feasible).
113 Examples of successful cost-effective programs include Multisystemic Therapy,
Aggression Replacement Training, Functional Family Therapy, and Multidimensional
Treatment Foster Care. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 168–69; Elizabeth S.
Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L.
REV. 35, 75–78 (2010).
114 See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
115 See Carter Hay et al., Tracing the Rise of Evidence-Based Juvenile Justice in Florida, 13
VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 312, 312 (2018); Scott W. Henggeler & Sonja K. Schoenwald, Evi-
dence-Based Interventions for Juvenile Offenders and Juvenile Justice Policies That Support Them, 25
SOC. POL’Y REP., no. 1, 2011, at 10; Editorial, Two Words: Wasteful and Ineffective, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/opinion/11mon1.html (describ-
ing programs offering community-focused alternatives to incarceration in New York and
advocating for further reform along those lines).
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B. State Regulation of Families
The second area in which empirical research has had an important
impact is in the regulation of the family and of the parent-child relationship.
Here, progress has been more uneven than in the juvenile justice context.
Child development research and studies of foster-care outcomes provide
strong support for contemporary policies restricting state intervention in
families that disrupts the child’s relationship with her parents.  Other
research on early childhood and on the needs of children in single parent
families has influenced lawmakers to provide prekindergarten and other pre-
vention programs to children.116  But the potential impact of early childhood
research is far from fully realized.  Although a consensus holds that early
childhood prevention programs enhance children’s healthy development
and are cost effective, states have been slow to provide these services.117
Over the past several decades, child protection policy has seesawed; in
some periods family preservation is prioritized, while in others, a child pro-
tection rationale has justified an aggressive interventionist approach.  In
recent years, lawmakers have increasingly embraced family preservation.118
Many factors have contributed to this move and empirical research has not
played a major explicit role.  But family preservation policies are strongly sup-
ported and reinforced by consistent findings in child development research,
clarifying that a strong parent-child relationship is critical for healthy child
development and that disruption of this relationship threatens serious harm
to the child.119  A regime of robust parental rights protects this critical rela-
tionship by restricting state intervention in the family and limiting the harms
that often follow from intervention and removal.  It is well understood today
that children suffer serious harm from the instability that follows removal
from parental custody, even if their parents’ care has been suboptimal.120
Moreover, studies also find that children fare poorly in foster care and that
the state often fails to promote their well-being when it disrupts families.121
This research can stabilize the current approach of grounding child protec-
tion in a principle of family preservation, supporting families and restricting
removal of children from their homes.122
116 See, e.g., Huntington & Scott, supra note 8.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 For the foundational work on the importance of attachment and the harms from
disruption, see 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS 27–30, 209, 326, 330 (1969); 2 id. at
3–16, 245–56 (1973); and 3 id. at 7–14, 397–411 (1980).
120 See Huntington & Scott, supra note 8.
121 Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 661 (2006)
(describing the harmful short- and long-term consequences of foster care).
122 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PRE-
SERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN 1 (2020), https://www
.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/reunify.pdf (noting that all states require child welfare agen-
cies to make reasonable efforts to help families remedy conditions and prevent child
removal); The Child Welfare Placement Continuum: What’s Best for Children?, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 3, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/the-child-
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The child development research has played a key role in a recent debate
in which some legal scholars have challenged strong parental rights as a ves-
tige of an outdated regime.123  In response, other scholars have marshaled
child development research in support of policies protecting parental rights
and restricting state intervention.124  Scholars in the second group have also
argued that protection from state intervention is especially important for
children of color and low-income families given the disparities in the child
welfare system.125  Parental rights provide a shield against excessive state
intrusion driven by racial and ethnic bias.126
A more controversial use of science in child welfare practice is predictive
analytics, employed in decisionmaking about intervention in families and
removal of children.  Critics argue that this technology produces high false-
positive rates and that some factors incorporated into the algorithm are
biased against poor families of color.127  But these criticisms go largely to the
accuracy of the current algorithms.  Improvement potentially can result in an
instrument to assist human decisionmakers, who are also biased against poor
families and often inclined to intervene excessively.  At a minimum, predic-
welfare-placement-continuum-what-s-best-for-children.aspx (“Ideally, a child at risk of
abuse or neglect can remain with his or her birth family and receive in-home services
designed to strengthen and support the family . . . .”).
123 See Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J.
1448, 1456 (2018) (challenging the importance of parental authority in contemporary
family law).  These authors argue that parental rights play an important protective role for
very young children but, beyond this period, parental rights should be limited by “situating
the parent-child relationship within a larger web of children’s relationships and interests.”
Id. at 1510; see also James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1426–39 (1994) (opposing parental
rights); Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, 34 FAM. L.Q.
421 (2000).
124 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 35–39 (2005);
DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 267–76 (2002);
Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV.
279, 285–90; Huntington & Scott, supra note 8; Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents
as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995).
125 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 124; ROBERTS, supra note 124; Huntington & Scott,
supra note 8.
126 See Huntington & Scott, supra note 8.
127 See Glaberson, supra note 70, at 345 (“Algorithms trained on data representing his-
torical biases will inherit those biases.”); Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided
Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364, 378–87
(2019) (discussing the dramatic burdens false positives impose on individuals and noting
that “[t]he Los Angeles County Office of Child Protection halted the adoption of another
child welfare algorithm when auditing indicated a ninety-five percent false-positive rate”);
supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.  The technology is also criticized on the ground
that it is opaque, with developers holding proprietary rights. See Robert Brauneis & Ellen
P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 153–59
(2018).
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tive-analytic outcomes can serve as a limiting device, restraining state actors
from excessive intervention.128
Other scientifically based family policies have begun to emerge.  Child
development research and theory strongly supports the value for child well-
being of family support and educational programs early in life.129  Longitudi-
nal research on fragile families supports that these programs can offer bene-
fits to children in poverty, and especially to those in single-parent families.130
On the basis of empirical evidence, states from Oklahoma to Vermont have
adopted universal preschool programs; moreover, some states have
embraced parenting education, childcare, and other social support programs
that have been shown to strengthen families with young children.131  Given
the clear evidence that family support programs enhance child well-being for
the most vulnerable families and are also cost effective, advocates argue that
progress toward adopting these programs and toward embracing a preventive
approach to child welfare has been very slow.132
* * *
The two examples of domains in which empirical research has had an
important impact on family law and policy offer some lessons on effective
deployment of science in this realm and on avoidance of various kinds of
misuse.  First, in both the juvenile-justice and family-intervention contexts,
the bodies of research shaping legal policy are substantial and grounded in
extensive general developmental knowledge that has accrued over an
extended period.  Behavioral and biological scientists studying child and ado-
lescent development employ methodological tools carefully without advocacy
goals; their objective is to map human development.  Studies are overlapping
and cumulative and are guided by scientific values and norms and subject to
rigorous peer review.  Second, this foundation of developmental research has
been augmented by demographic research and by more targeted studies
employing a range of methodologies, including longitudinal and cross-sec-
tional research examining legal issues of interest, from the competence of
individuals at different ages to participate in the legal process to the out-
comes of children in various placements in the child welfare and justice sys-
tems.  The findings of these studies converge with those of the underlying
128 In other words, the state actor’s decision to intervene must be confirmed by the
algorithm.
129 See LYNN A. KAROLY ET AL., RAND CORP., EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS 55–86
(2005) (summarizing research on the benefits of early childhood intervention).
130 See Deborah Lowe Vandell et al., Do Effects of Early Child Care Extend to Age 15 Years?
Results from the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development, 81 CHILD DEV. 737,
738 (2010) (citing studies). See generally Arthur J. Reynolds et al., Long-Term Effects of an
Early Childhood Intervention on Educational Achievement and Juvenile Arrest: A 15-Year Follow-Up
of Low-Income Children in Public Schools, 285 JAMA 2339 (2001).
131 Huntington & Scott, supra note 8.
132 These authors show that lawmakers have long embraced a crisis intervention
approach rather than a preventive approach that supports families. Id.
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developmental research and present a coherent account of child and adoles-
cent abilities and behavior.  For example, research on the relationship
between age and adjudicative competence, comprehension of Miranda
rights, and the capacity to make informed abortion decisions are all consis-
tent with general research on cognitive development in decision-making abil-
ity during adolescence.133  This convergence enhances confidence in the
reliability and validity of the research.  Program evaluation studies are promi-
nent in both juvenile-justice and family-support contexts and also are consis-
tent with underlying developmental research (and indeed are often
grounded in that research), allowing decisionmakers to confidently measure
the cost and effectiveness of different interventions.
III. EMPIRICAL FAMILY LAW AND VALUE COMPETITION
Some critics express concern that the turn toward empiricism may
obscure important value competitions in family law or have undue influence
on how different values are prioritized.  Clare Huntington argues that
research on child outcomes may undermine the value assigned to protecting
parents in vulnerable groups that have suffered historic discrimination.134
For example, Huntington is concerned that if studies were to show that
Native American children fared better in white adoptive families than in tri-
bal placements, protection of family and tribal rights would be threatened,
despite historic discrimination.135  Further, because research findings must
result in measurable outcomes, critics note that intangible matters that are
hard to quantify (for example, a child’s sense of security in her family or
identity with her tribe) may not be studied, and therefore are likely to be
discounted by lawmakers.136  Ultimately, Huntington proposes that in
debates of competing values, scientific empirical input should be limited.
On her view, science is relevant to deciding how much different legal rules
133 See Grisso, supra note 110, at 1151–60 (Miranda study); Grisso et al., supra note 110,
at 333–36 (study of adjudicative competence); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The
Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV.
1589, 1590 (1982) (study of abortion decisionmaking).
134 See Huntington, supra note 2, at 233.
135 See id.
136 For example, a child’s sense of security with family is much harder to measure than
academic progress or developmental milestones. See Huntington, supra note 2, at 253
n.140, 284–85.  Similar arguments have been made in other contexts. See Jane H. Aiken &
Stephen Wizner, Measuring Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 79, 80–81 (discussing the difficulties
in quantifying adequate legal representation for poor and marginalized communities);
Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 325 (2004)
(arguing the heavy costs of criminal law enforcement have been discounted by lawmakers
in part because they are difficult to quantify); David C. Kimball-Stanley, The “Relationship
Premium”: Should Cost-Benefit Analysis Include the Value of Human Connections?, 48 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,402, 10,402 (2018) (arguing that cost-benefit analyses discount the unquantifiable
but significant value of human relationships).
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will advance certain values, but it should not replace a robust debate about
the values themselves.137
Huntington’s critique of empiricism raises valid concerns and highlights
the importance of separating empirical and nonempirical dimensions of val-
ues debates.  But the task is Herculean (as Huntington acknowledges)
because values often have empirical content, and accuracy in evaluating the
stakes of the value contest is critically important.  Ultimately, on my view, the
problem of misuse of science discussed earlier looms larger than this more
foundational concern.
To be sure, values shape family law and policy, and competing values
often cannot be prioritized based on empirical knowledge.  Early in the
movement to apply social science research to family law matters, Robert
Mnookin warned enthusiastic interdisciplinary scholars that many issues were
not resolvable on the basis of empirical knowledge.138  Thus a court applying
the best interest standard to determine child custody must prioritize among
various goals—and often science will provide little guidance.139  But scien-
tific research sometimes is relevant to evaluating and weighing one value
against another.  Although there is a risk that research support will distort
the weighing of values in the legal arena, lawmakers often do not lose sight of
the value competition.  For example, the law protects parental authority by
maintaining a privilege to use reasonable corporal punishment or (in some
states) to withhold vaccines from their children, despite substantial evidence
that these practices can be harmful.140  Further, research demonstrating that
a minor by age fourteen is capable of making an informed medical decision
weighs in favor of authorizing minors to make autonomous abortion deci-
sions.141  But this has done little to resolve the debate over minors’ access to
abortion, and lawmakers in many states impose restrictions on minors in def-
erence to parental authority.142  Finally, as discussed above, powerful
research evidence supporting the benefits of investments in early childhood
has had only modest influence on a child welfare system that valorizes liberta-
137 See Huntington, supra note 2, at 282–91, 296–303 (proposing a limited role for
empirical evidence in the context of competing values but also noting the numerous ways
the distinction between facts and values collapses).
138 See Mnookin, supra note 19.
139 See id. at 260 (“Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less ultimate
than the purposes and values of life itself.”).
140 See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.24 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2018) (discussing rationales for the parental privilege to use reasonable corpo-
ral punishment, despite evidence that corporal punishment is not effective and can cause
harm when harsh).  For a discussion of the parental right to withhold vaccines, see gener-
ally Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Essay, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are Consti-
tutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589 (2016); and Frej Klem Thomsen, Childhood Immunization,
Vaccine Hesitancy, and Provaccination Policy in High-Income Countries, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 324 (2017).
141 See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 133, at 1590.
142 See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.02 cmt. a & reporters’ note (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
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rian values associated with self-sufficiency.143  These examples suggest that
empirical research may be invoked in legal debates implicating core values—
and it may be relevant to weighing one value against another.  But empirical
knowledge does not necessarily determine how values are prioritized, nor
does empirical input obscure the competition.  In each of these examples,
courts and other lawmakers have not discounted the values competing with
those supported by research; indeed, often the empirical support gets short
shrift.
On my view, the application of relevant empirical knowledge grounded
in sound science to legal policy debates is usually beneficial.  Research can
reinforce or diminish the importance of the underlying values themselves in
particular contexts.144  It can also play a key—and legitimate—role in priori-
tizing contested values.  For example, studies showing that youths have a
poorer understanding of Miranda warnings than do adults, are far more sus-
ceptible to coercive influence by authority figures, and confess at much
higher rates have led some states to adopt special protections for youths in
interrogation.145  Effectively, these lawmakers, on the basis of this empirical
evidence, have prioritized the value of fairness to accused youths over that of
public protection.  If youths and adults responded similarly in interrogation,
there would be no need or call for reform.  Similarly, if adolescents were
incompetent to make informed medical decisions about abortion, the argu-
ment for prioritizing their reproductive autonomy over parental authority
would be weaker.  The research strengthens the claim for prioritizing the
value of autonomy over that of parental authority.
The debates of concern to critics often involve contexts in which child
well-being is thought to be in competition with parental authority and family
privacy.  To be sure, as Huntington suggests, opponents of special protec-
tions for Native American parents under the Indian Child Welfare Act may
invoke research challenging whether these policies promote (at least some
aspects of) individual children’s well-being.146  But good empirical research
can often assist to resolve value contests in ways that support parental author-
ity.  Consider, for example, the complex, and ultimately beneficial, role that
research has played in the modern formulation of the parental privilege to
use reasonable physical discipline.  Some child advocates have pointed to
research showing the harms of corporal punishment and to expert opinions
advocating for abolition of the parental privilege.147  Supporters of the privi-
143 See supra text accompanying notes 129–32.
144 Thus, research weakens parental autonomy claims to withhold vaccines from chil-
dren. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
145 RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 14.21 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2018) (discussing research on minors’ reduced comprehension of Miranda
rights); id. § 14.21 cmt. h (discussing research on minors’ vulnerability to coercion and
increased rates of confessions).  The Restatement follows states that provide special protec-
tions (presence of counsel) for younger minors. Id. § 14.22 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018).
146 Huntington, supra note 2, at 286–87.
147 See e.g., Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family Health, Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics, Guidance for Effective Discipline, 101 PEDIATRICS 723, 726 (1998) (concluding that
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lege have not defended corporal punishment as a practice.148  Rather, they
have pointed out that research evidence indicates that only harsh punish-
ment (and not spanking) is harmful to child well-being.149  Just as important,
opponents of abolition have argued that physical discipline continues to be
used by black parents, and redefining it as child abuse would expand oppor-
tunities for state intervention in families already subject to intrusive state
oversight.150  Instead of abolition, lawmakers have modernized the privilege
to prohibit forms of punishment that were once acceptable but that are now
understood to be harmful to children and therefore not “reasonable.”151  In
the value competition between child well-being and family privacy, the
research ultimately demonstrated that the two values could be reconciled.
In evaluating the role that empirical research should play in family law
and policy, it is important to ask: Compared to what?  Often the alternative
basis for empirical conclusions and assumptions is human intuition and judg-
ment, which seems more concerning.  A court is on shaky ground when it
relies on the “pages of human experience” in support of its conclusion that
parents usually consider only their child’s interest in admitting the child to a
psychiatric hospital.152  On most issues on which competing principles and
values are interwoven with empirical assumptions and questions, sophisti-
cated use of sound research, if available, will usually be superior to intuition
and speculation as a means of informing those questions—because it will
“spanking is a less effective strategy than time-out or removal of privileges for reducing
undesired behavior in children”); Elizabeth T. Gershoff, More Harm than Good: A Summary
of Scientific Research on the Intended and Unintended Effects of Corporal Punishment on Children,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2010, at 31, 40–56 (summarizing unintended negative
effects of corporal punishment and concluding the harms outweigh the benefits); Eliza-
beth T. Gershoff & Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, Spanking and Child Outcomes: Old Controversies
and New Meta-Analyses, 30 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 453, 457 (2016) (finding a correlation, though
not causation, between spanking and detrimental outcomes for children).
148 See Huntington & Scott, supra note 8 (arguing that the privilege is justified as a limit
on harmful state intervention, which disproportionately affects communities of color).
The Restatement of Children and the Law comments offer several modern rationales for
the privilege, including respect for family integrity, pluralism, and parental decisionmak-
ing. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.24 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2018).
149 See Diana Baumrind et al., Ordinary Physical Punishment: Is It Harmful? Comment on
Gershoff (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 580, 581 (2002) (finding that although there is scien-
tific consensus that “overly severe forms of corporal punishment” are detrimental, there is
no consensus about spanking); Huntington & Scott, supra note 8, at 38–41 (describing
research that supports this conclusion).
150 See Huntington & Scott, supra note 8, at 38–41 (favoring the privilege to use reason-
able corporal punishment based on concerns about expanding harmful state intervention
into families already at risk of disruption, particularly low-income families and families of
color). See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.24 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2018).
151 Huntington & Scott, supra note 8, at 39 n.255 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN
AND THE LAW § 3.24(b) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018) (providing that a use
of punishment that causes more than transient marks is not reasonable)).
152 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–04 (1979).
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enhance accuracy.  For example, in the debates about extending marriage to
same-sex couples, opponents’ claims about the harms of same-sex parenting,
likely grounded in antigay bias, would have been answered much less effec-
tively without compelling research.
The general point likely also applies to contexts in which child well-
being and parental authority are thought to compete.  Human deci-
sionmakers are subject to racial and other biases that are likely to influence
their judgments in making decisions that prioritize these values.  It seems
unlikely (although it is an empirical question) that families of color will fare
better if empirical evidence plays a background role in debates about the
trade-off between child well-being and family privacy (or in the justice system,
between child well-being and public safety).153  To be sure, biased deci-
sionmakers may reflexively rely on thin empirical support for a practice or
policy that ostensibly promotes child welfare, while harming poor parents.
But the past history of oppression and current experience of marginalization
are front and center today in conversations about the state’s relationship with
families of color and poor families.154  It is plausible that more often than
not, empirical evidence will protect the interests of marginalized families bet-
ter than reliance on conventional wisdom and assumptions about the world.
The latter seems almost always to be inferior as a basis of policy and more
likely to result in biased calculations.
CONCLUSION
Margaret Brinig was a pioneer as an interdisciplinary scholar and has
been a leading empiricist working in family law for decades.  She has been
appropriately cautious and critical in her evaluation of the role of scientific
research in this field.  Modern scholars and researchers, following Brinig’s
lead, have become increasingly sophisticated in understanding the promise
and limits of social science and in conducting interdisciplinary policy-rele-
vant research.  Legal scholars also are training a generation of lawyers who
can deploy and critique scientific evidence in litigation and in lawmaking.
To be sure, legal actors continue to misuse empirical research, offering weak
studies or deploying solid research inappropriately in support of advocacy
positions.  But the trend is positive; there is good reason to be optimistic that
the expanding use of empirical research will contribute to law and policy
reform that better serves the interests of children and families.
153 See Huntington & Scott, supra note 8 (describing heightened awareness of racial
disproportionality (based on research evidence) in the justice system).
154 Awareness of racial discrimination is also at the heart of debates.
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